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Family firms are entities that possess and contribute greatly to all economies worldwide. In 
the following study we investigate capital structures and ownership dispersion among 
Swedish family firms. In order to find concluding results, we proceed with a regression 
between leverage and family business, leverage and family firm age, and leverage and 
ownership dispersion. Our regression outcomes support a U- shaped relationship between 
family ownership dispersion and leverage, but do not confirm a relation between leverage and 
family business. Earlier studies made in the field have generated differing results; however, 
there are some studies that are actually in line with our findings. A unique database developed 
at Jönköping University is used that enables us to obtain access to firm level data. Earlier 
studies in the same genre have only had access to industry level data. 
Keywords: Family firms; Capital structure; Closed medium sized enterprises; Ownership 
Dispersion; Corporate Governance 
JEL classification: G3 
Introduction 
Among the registered companies in Europe, more than 50 percent are organized 
as family firms; contributing both with entrepreneurial skills, innovation and employment 
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers Family Business Survey 2007/08). Similarly, between 65 percent - 
90 percent of all registered companies in Latin America are operated by families, while in the 
United  States  the  figure  reaches  an  astonishing  proportion  of  95  percent.  Likewise,  the 
economic power that these firms possess is very commendable. Among the member states of 
the European Union, family firms generate between 35 percent - 65 percent of the GNP. In 
Sweden, family firms account for over half the private business sector’s contribution to the 
GDP. However, uncertainties concerning their decision making and governance have been 
apparent as their organizational form is very distinct and unique.  
The challenges that family firms face are numerous as they have to care for the family 
along with establishing a strong commercial and financial stance. Point in fact; one of the 
most prevailing ambiguities apparent in family firms concerns their financial structure. As 
many of the family firms are small and medium sized enterprises of closed corporation type, 
their access to capital is limited. The issue of employing equity and/or debt as financial source 
is therefore of great concern. The purpose of the paper is to study the relationship between family ownership and 
capital  structures  in  private  (closed)  medium  sized  corporations.  Unique  Swedish  data  of 
ownership in closed corporations will be used. A special attention is devoted to the impact of 
dispersed family ownership on capital structures. A source of inspiration is in this case the U-
shaped  relationship  between  dispersion  and  leverage  suggested  by  Schulze,  Lubatkin  and 
Dino (2003). Our study differs from theirs by having access to detailed firm level data (they 
had to rely on industry level data). More of the variations in capital structure can thereby be 
explained 
Perhaps somewhat surprising, in the light of earlier studies, we find no significant 
relation  between  family  ownership  and  capital  structures.    Furthermore,  a  negative 
relationship between firm age and leverage is obtained both for family and non-family firms. 
A result more in line with earlier research is that the same type of curvilinear relationship as 
suggested by Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) is found in our study. Consequently we can 
replicate their result with Swedish private firm level data.  
The  rest  of  the  article  is  structured  as  follows:  First,  the  family  firm  concept  is 
discussed. Thereafter follows a section presenting earlier research and hypotheses. Next in 
turn is a section about data and models. At last the results and conclusions are presented.   
 
Defining Family Firms 
The definition of family firms in previous literature has been very diverse as it is 
difficult  to  generalise  and  find  a  common  consensus  regarding  this  organization  type. 
(Overviews are provided by Sharma (2004) and Kraus, Harms and Fink (2011)). Though, the 
more  usual  forms  of  businesses  that  have  fallen  under  the  category  have  mostly  been 
characterized as firms controlled and managed by numerous family members from different 
generations (Shankar and Astrachan, 1996; Lansberg, 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). For example McConaughy et al. (1998) regard any firm that is managed by the founder or the 
founder’s  family  members  as  a  family  firm.  In  the  same  manner,  researchers  such  as 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), Faccio and Lang (2002), La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and others regard any business as a family one as long 
as the founding family or individual owns a fraction of the company and/or is/are positioned 
as board member/s. Other researchers have similarly focused on the importance of involving 
numerous family members over time in the management or ownership of the firm; Villonga 
and Amit’s (2006) definition includes different levels and generations of individuals or family 
ownership.  However,  Bennedesen  et  al  (2006)  and  Perez  Gonzales  (2006)  take  this 
implication even further by focusing on the blood relationship between the founder and the 
current CEO, and thereby defining family firms as such. 
In our paper, family firms are simply defined based on the information provided by the 
firms  investigated.  A  database  concerning  family  ownership  in  Swedish  firms  has  been 
developed at Jönköping International Business School from which this unique dataset will be 
extracted. The chosen entities have simply answered if they consider themselves as family 
firms at the time when the survey was conducted (2008). It is the same approach as used by 
Westhead and Cowling (1998). 
 
Earlier Research and Hypotheses 
Empirical studies of family ownership and capital structure 
The concept of family firms as an academic area of study is relatively new. The 
empirical results obtained from earlier studies differ greatly. In an early empirical study Kim 
and Sorensen (1986) the relationship between leverage and insider ownership is depicted as 
positive and significant. Stulz (1988) argues that firms with controlling block-holders exhibit 
higher financial leverage due to their unwillingness to dilute ownership further. Accordingly, 
family firms employ more debt in order to retain the control and thus avert any takeover attempts  by  outside  shareholders.  In  a  survey  conducted  by  Poutziouris,  Sitorus  and 
Chittenden (2002) it is accordingly evident how the most prevailing factor that deters family 
firms from accepting equity financing is their fear of losing control. Yet, even without the 
threat of takeover, family firms still seem to prefer debt as they do not want to jeopardize their 
dominance.  Harijono  (2005)  is  on  the  same  track  and  reports  that  family  firms  seem  to 
employ, on average, 20 percent more in debt than non-family firms. This relationship was 
recently also confirmed by Ellul (2008) who found a positive relation between leverage and 
family ownership when studying 3608 firms from 36 different countries.  
In contrast, researchers such as Daily and Dollinger (1992) argue that family firms are 
more risk averse and thus reluctant to employ debt. Point in fact, a study conducted by Gallo, 
Tapies and Cappuyns  (2004)  shows that leverage ratio is lower among family firms. These 
results  are  statistically  significant.  Another  study  confirming  the  lower  leverage  ratios  is 
conducted by Ampengerger et. al (2009) who explore the situation of German family firms. 
They search for the possible relation between debt and family firms across three different 
dimensions;  ―ownership,  supervisory  and  management  board  activities  by  the  founding 
family‖.  
However, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that insider ownership – either by manager 
or families – has no impact on capital structure decisions at all. Families turn out to employ 
somewhat less debt (18.42 percent) than nonfamily firms (19.34 percent); though, the findings 
are not statistically significant. Given these varied and contradicting evidences, we do not 
have any definite priors on the effects of family ownership on the debt and equity ratio.  
 
Family Firms and Capital Structures from an Agency Cost Perspective 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed and argued for the inevitable importance 
of  agency  costs  within  corporate  finance.  The  theory  is  based  upon  the  assumption  of 
diverging  interests  when  ownership  and  management  are  separated;  more  clearly  the relationship between a principal (for example the shareholders) and the agent (for example the 
manager). Hence, if ownership and management are separated different conflicting interests 
emerge and create tension; resulting in high agency costs. It is believed that all stakeholders 
involved choose to act in a manner that maximises their own personal utility, even at others' 
expense.  
In view of the agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), family firms 
are  believed  to  be  more  efficient  as  the  principal  (owner)  and  agent  (management)  are 
assumed to be one and the same person. This assumption has been so strongly conveyed that 
family firms have been used as a solid proposition to portray a non-conflicting firm with zero 
agency costs (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000).  This theory is to a great extent supported by both 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and McConaughy (2000) who suggest that the existing incentive 
structures in family firms create fewer agency conflicts between different claimants. Though, 
the previous belief that family firms do not bear agency conflicts at  all has been proven 
lacking in several cases as family firms have shown incentive structures that are very unique 
(Gomez–Mejia,  Nunez–Nickel  and Gutierrez, 2001; Steier, 2003). The conflicts in family 
firms may arise because of the dispersion of ownership, which creates a tension between the 
interest of those who manage a firm, and often own a controlling interest, and other family 
owners.  Persisting  problems  such  as  entrenched  ownership,  asymmetric  information  and 
altruism within the family firms may create difficulties (Gomez–Mejia, Nunez–Nickel  and 
Gutierrez, 2001; Schulze et al., 2001) and  lead to the need of monitoring. 
Most often family firms operate with private capital, and owners therefore need to 
monitor and control the firm they have invested in. Their wealth is strongly linked to the 
continuation of the firm, and therefore they also have a stronger incentive to monitor than 
other large shareholders do (Harijono, 2005). This implies that the risk taking behaviour of 
the family firm is probably different from the nonfamily one (Daily and Dollinger, 1992). As most of the wealth of the family is invested in the company, the risk taking is assumed to be 
minimized by the employment of less debt. Family firms’ interest also lies in passing their 
firm as a going concern to the future generations; they consider their firm as an asset to 
bequeath to the family rather than wealth they can employ today (Casson, 1999; Chami 1999). 
The survival instinct thus differentiates the family firms from other organizational forms, and 
increases their need to minimize risk and align the interest of all stakeholders. The concept of 
altruism also becomes relevant in relation to family firms as this behaviour emphasizes the 
positive linkage between family members happiness (Becker, 1981). It may be so that the 
family firms choose to forgo their existing consumption for the welfare of their heirs, and 
develop a risk averse behaviour where future family consumption is the main concern. Miller, 
Le  Breton-Miller  and  Scholnick  (2008)  study  the  nature  of  family  firms  and  propose  a 
stagnation phenomenon which takes form through, amongst other, a risk averse behaviour, 
lack of financial and management resources and growth impeding decisions.  
From  the  discussion  above  it  is  tempting  to  conclude  that  family  firms  have  less 
conflicts and are thus able to minimize agency costs as the decisions are taken in the best 
interest of both family and firm. Such a conclusion would imply that a negative relation 
between family ownership and leverage can be expected. However, contrasting views have 
suggested that these ―firms are plagued by conflicts that can cause them to flounder, if not fail 
and  that  they  are  vulnerable  to  a  form  of  inertia  that  can  paralyse  decision  making  and 
threaten firm survival‖ (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003). In an empirical study, Schulze et 
al. (2001) find that family firms are more difficult to manage because of self control and the 
dilemma of altruism. They argue that family control insulates the firm from the discipline role 
of external markets such as corporate control and labour markets, and the resources are thus 
not  correctly  allocated.  Empirical  research  by  Gomez-Mejia,  Nunez-Nickel  and  Gutierrez 
(2001) suggests that family firms suffer from higher agency costs compared to others as they are often unwilling to fire incompetent family members. According to their findings family 
owned firms in Spain are more reluctant to fire family CEOs, and in general more hesitant to 
stringently monitor and discipline family members due to their personal relationship.  
Also, family firms may employ more debt in order to control the self- interests of the 
family agents; to limit the negative consequences of altruism within the firm. It is argued that 
altruism causes parents to increase their generosity, which can result in a dilemma where their 
children free ride (Schulze et al., 2001).  An impression of entitlement and privilege may 
develop among the family members (Lubatkin, Ling and Schulze, 2007). They might engage 
in persuading the lead of the firm to utilize resources of the firm to satisfy family members; 
possibly through ―employment, prerequisites, and privileges that they otherwise would not 
receive‖ (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003).  In order to discipline and avoid the free riding 
of problem caused by family members, the usage of debt may be more extensive than the 
agency theory predicts. 
The  upshot  is  that  the  relation  between  family  ownership  and  capital  structure  is 
complex. On  the one hand, the concentration of control  to  a family implies less need of 
leverage for lowering agency costs. On the other hand, there are arguments that intra-family 
conflicts  tend  to  increase  the  use  of  debt  as  a  monitoring  device.  Our  hypothesis  is 
subsequently inconclusive: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Family Ownership has a relation with leverage but the sign is uncertain 
The Impact of Ownership Dispersion on Leverage in Family Firms 
In private family firms there is typically a principal shareholder, who is often the 
founder  and  CEO  of  the  firm,  and  minor  shareholders  who  belong  to  either  the  core  or 
peripheral family circle. Some of the family members may be employed by the family firm, 
whilst others are only stakeholders. As family firms tend to branch into several generations, the family firm-ownership does similarly tend to change in a more intervallic and phase wise 
trend. It is seen how the shareholding is passed on to future generations at the time of the 
principal shareholder’s death or retirement. 
According to Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) the ownership of family firms can be 
separated into three different stages of dispersion. At the start up phase there is a controlling 
owner who is most probably the founder and owns most of the shares. Thereafter the firm 
enters a sibling partnership in which the ownership dispersion is almost equally spread among 
the owners in a single generation. At last the firm enters the era of third and later generations, 
and as the shareholding is further fractionalised the cousin consortium is reached. 
The controlling owners of family firms, and in particular the founders, will at the 
beginning be very motivated to use debt to finance their chosen investments. Due to the lack 
of access to equity markets, the leverage of the firm may increase substantially as the firm has 
to develop its establishment. The long term investment behaviour is based on the controlling 
owner’s expectation frame, and does not necessarily include the expectations of the remaining 
family (both non shareholders and minority shareholders). The concern of the controlling 
owner is thus to choose the most appropriate investment alternatives based on the prospects of 
the market. By time however agency conflicts become apparent as the controlling owner may 
confuse  which  incentives  that  maximise  the  value  of  the  firm,  and  which  incentives  that 
maximise his or her personal utility along with the family's utility. The existence of negative 
parental altruism, sense of entitlement from the owner’s children, different opinions among 
family members and other issues may then cause the controlling owner to gradually change 
his or her estate plans. Both family members that are employed by the firm and others who 
are not may then free ride on the equity of the controlling owner. 
When ownership is further dispersed among family members, and the firm enters the 
sibling partnership stage, the debt financing seems to decline. One reason for this may be that the agency conflicts within the family become too extensive. Although the shareholding is 
assumed to be dispersed almost equally among the members, there is yet typically a principal 
shareholder. Therefore, the difficulties that emerge are those of authoritative nature as the 
major owner of the firms is often neither the biological lead of the family nor the initiator of 
the firm. This may result in loss of influence for the principal shareholder over the other 
siblings.  The  decisions  taken  by  the  principal  may  thus  be  difficult  to  employ  as  all  the 
stakeholders will have different opinions regarding which opportunities to pursue. 
A risk and loss averse behaviour may become evident because of issues related to 
negative parental altruism, sense of entitlement and other phenomena related to family firms 
specifically. Some of the family members may prefer consumption in the form of pecuniary 
and  non-pecuniary  benefits  rather  than  investments,  which  will  then  occur  at  the  cost  of 
forgone beneficial investments. As each sibling tries to maximise his or her family’s utility, 
the conflicts will increase within the firm. The firm may then be trapped in a status quo like 
situation where none of the siblings or the principal will be willing to take on more debt and 
thus risk. Also, the siblings may feel a pressure to sustain or enhance the dividend pay-out. 
The result will be reduced debt even when the market situation is believed to be favourable, 
and the firm  may fail because of its  lack of engagement in  different  ventures.  Kaye and 
Hamilton  (2004)  do  likewise  believe  that  descendants  are  less  likely  to  employ  a  highly 
leveraged capital structure as they are more concerned about wealth preservation rather than 
creation. This conservative orientation does also concord with the stagnation theory suggested 
by  Miller,  Le  Breton-Miller  and  Scholnick  (2008),  as  mentioned  earlier.  However,  the 
stagnating effect becomes reversed as the family firms enter yet another era.  
Hence,  when  the  cousin  consortium  level  is  reached  ownership  is  dispersed  with 
further fractionalised shareholding. There is most probably not a controlling owner. The risk 
preference is assumed to be less constrained as the owners do most likely belong to later generations and are part of the peripheral family circle, from which most are probably not 
employed by the firm.  They have not overinvested in the family firm, and their approach is 
more comparable to those of institutional investors and others who invest in public firms. 
Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) therefore hypothesize that the managers of family firms 
reaching a cousin consortium are more willing and likely to bear risk and employ debt to 
pursue appropriate and promising investments.   
Subsequently, the hypothesis that Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) form is that debt 
financing will be more preferred when ownership is either concentrated in the hands of a 
single owner as in the controlling owner stage, or when it is dispersed in the hands of several 
shareholders  as  in  the  cousin  consortium.  Also,  the  use  of  debt  is  minimised  when  the 
ownership is divided into relatively equal proportions as in the sibling partnership. Molly, 
Laveren and Deloof (2010) do also explore the succession effects on leverage in family firms 
among  Flemish  companies.  They  find  that  the  level  of  debt  seems  to  declines  with  4 
percentage points at the time of the first generational change. Following this is an increase in 
the leverage with 6 percentage points as the family firm undergoes a second generational 
change. 
Seen from the perspective of ownership dispersion a U shaped relationship between 
leverage  and  ownership  dispersion  can  be  expected  with  relatively  high  leverage  in  the 
controlling owner stage, a decrease in leverage when ownership gets more dispersed in the 
sibling  partnership  stage  and  finally  a  rise  in  leverage  when  ownership  gets  even  more 
dispersed in the cousin consortium stage. In light of this theory our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between a family firm’s use of leverage and the dispersion of 
its ownership can be graphed as a U-shaped curve. 
 
The Impact of Firm Age on Capital Structure  The  link  between  firm  age  and  leverage  in  family  businesses  has  also  been 
investigated in many studies. Romano, Tanewski and Smyrnios (2001) review the literature in 
their empirical study of the 5000 largest businesses in Australia. The synthesis of their review 
is that the source of capital depends, to some extent, on where the firm is in its business life 
cycle.  Newly  started  or  developing  firms  may  find  it  difficult  to  raise  debt  due  to  their 
vulnerable position. Accordingly, the owner-managers of small and young firms tend to rather 
employ internal finance. Given this, family firms may be able to acquire debt financing easier 
as time passes by. Based on their evaluation of earlier research, they test the hypothesis   ''The 
age of a family firm is associated positively with debt'' (Romano, Tanewski and Smyrnios,  
2001:293), but are not able to ascertain it as statistically significant.  
More  recently  study  Blanco-Mazagatos,  de  Quevedo-Puente  and  Castrillo  (2007) 
compare family business and non-family businesses. Akin to our study their sample consists 
of private firms. Only firms with more than 10 workers are included. Among other things the 
financial structure is studied.  A division between younger businesses (<25 years old) and 
older businesses (>25 years old) is made. They find that there was only for old businesses that 
a difference in leverage (debt/total assets) between family and nonfamily businesses could be 
found.  Old  family  businesses  had  a  comparatively  higher  leverage.  But  there  was  no 
indication that leverage was increasing with firm age. On the opposite leverage seemed to 
decrease especially for nonfamily businesses. 
In our study firm age will be used as an explanatory variable of leverage. In light of 
Romano, Tanewski and Smyrnios (2001) we state the hypothesis that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Leverage is positively associated with the age of a family firm 
 
Data and Model Data Collection Method 
Our sample data is extracted from a database comprised of Swedish firms, and 
created  by  the  Centre  of  Family  Enterprise  and  Ownership  (CeFEO)  at  Jönköping 
International Business School. The database was constructed with assistance of statisticians. 
A representative sample was randomly drawn from the population of 270 057 active limited 
companies  in  Sweden;  resulting  in  a  selection  of  2522  active  firms.  These  firms  were 
categorized based on their number of employees, which is a method adopted from SCB (The 
Statistical Central Bureau in Sweden). See Table 1.1 
—  Table 1 in here —  
 
A survey was sent out to the 2522 chosen firms. 40 percent answered after the 
second round of send outs. The survey inquires about the time of incorporation and asks for 
information about the five largest shareowners. The latter question is defined based on the 
number  of  shares  the  owners  hold,  as  well  as  their  share  of  voting  power.  A  question 
regarding their own opinion of the status of the firm as a family business was included. 
With  a  focus  on  medium  sized  enterprises  (MEs)  as  classified  by  the  European 
Commission (2003/361/EC), we gathered data from the 151 firms in the 50-99 class and from 
95 firms in the 100-199 class (the groups in the middle of table 1). The yearly financial 
information  and  consolidated  financial  statements  of  these  firms  was  extracted  from  the 
database Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk). 
Firms with less than three years of balance sheet data and public limited companies 
were sorted out.  Furthermore, companies in which the ownership stake by the five largest 
shareholders is less than 66.67 percent as well as firms with leverage ratio less than zero were 
excluded.  We  also  used  Mahalanobi’s  distance  statistics  method  to  detect  outliers 
(Gnanadesikan and Kettenring, 1972). At last a data sample with 177 observations of both private  family  and  non-family  firms  remained.  This  is  sample  data  we  use  to  test  the 
relationship between private MEs (family and non-family businesses) and leverage. Another 
subset, constructed from the large sample of 177 firms, is also produced and includes only 78 
private family firms. This  data is  used to  test  the hypotheses 2  and 3  concerning  family 
ownership dispersion and leverage and family firm age and leverage. 
Variables 
Table 2 describes our variables along with stating their respective sources. Our 
main focuses are the following variables: Leverage, Family business, Age, Firm’s sales 
growth, and Balance of voting power. All of these are measured and analyzed in the 
subsequent section along with the rest of the variables. 
—  Table 2 in here —  
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
There are two data sets used in the analysis covering all firms respectively only 
family firms. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all firms while table 4 covers family 
firms. For all firms it can be observed that the ownership concentration is rather high (0.8117) 
even though less than half of them are family firms. Also, the Swedish MEs pays an average 
effective tax rate of 13.3 percent.  
—  Table 3 in here —  
 
A comparison between the tables indicates a higher variation of leverage in non-
family firms. On average, family firms tend to have higher measures of profitability, asset 
tangibility, and size compared to non-family firms. However the median level of gearing in 
family firms is higher than that of the larger sample. Moreover, their sizes are substantially larger compared to others. The most notable feature of the family firms in table 4 is their high 
level of concentration in voting power (the BVP’s mean is 0.409). 
 
—  Table 4 in here —  
 
In the correlation analysis with all firms included (Table 5), taxes and size are 
two variables that have a tendency of being correlated with other variables. This is not a 
problem since all the financial variables are correlated to some extent; though it may pose 
some difficulties in interpreting the explanatory powers of these two variables. 
—  Table 5 in here  — 
 
There  are  just  a  few  significant  correlations  in  the  analysis  concerning  just 
family firms (Table 6). Asset tangibility and profitability are correlated with taxes. 
 
—  Table 6 in here  — 
 
Model 
The ordinary least square (OLS) method is used to otain the coefficient estimate 
of the model. Even though we are inspired by the model created by Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
in the study about international capital structure, we have made some modifications in our 
own model. It is a ―trial and error‖ process. Specifically, the method of ―stepwise selection‖ is 
applied  to  choose  the  appropriate  variable.  The  model  developed  by  Rajan  and  Zingales 
(1995) follows as: 
 
Leverage= a + β1 Tangible Assets + β2 Market to Book Ratio + β3 Log Sales +        β4 Return on Assets + εi       
         
Our first model is an adaption and modification of the model above. We use this 
model to test the first hypothesis. 
Leverage= β0 + β1 Family business + β2 Ownership concentration + β3 Age + β4 Asset                                        
       Tangibility + β5 Profitability + β6 Taxes + β7 Size + εi                  (Model  1)
   
Two other models will be applied to test the second hypothesis about ownership 
structure of private family firms. These models do also analyze the relation between leverage 
and family firm age (the third hypothesis). We aim to follow Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino’s 
(2003)  field  study  in  which  they  ascertain  a  relationship  between  leverage  and  family 
ownership dispersion as a U- shaped curve in periods of market growth. We will therefore 
first  conduct  the  test  without  the  interaction  terms  to  see  the  direct  effect  of  ownership 
structure on the use of debt.  
 
Leverage= β0 + β1*BVP+ β2*BVP
2+ β3*Age+ β4*Asset tangibility+ β5*Profitability+ 
                β6*Taxes+ β7*Size+ εi             (Model 2) 
 
We then include interaction terms to see how the ownership structures together 
with sales growth determine the value of leverage in a third model.  
Leverage= β0 + β1*BVP+ β2*BVP
2+ β3*BVP*Sales growth+  
     β4*BVP_squared*Salesgrowth+ β5*Age+ β6*Asset tangibility+  
    β7*Profitability+ β8*Taxes+ β9*Size+ εi      (Model 3) Empirical Results and Analysis 
Overall, our models do exhibit a decent R
2. Most of the variation apparent in the 
debt and equity ratio is explained. Moreover, all three F-statistics indicate high significance of 
the chosen models.  We have also  conducted the Ramsey RESET  Test, White’s Test  and 
Breusch-Godfrey’s  Test  for  misspecification,  heteroscedasticity,  and  autocorrelation 
respectively in all three models. The results indicate that we do not suffer from the above 
mentioned problems. The results can be viewed in Table 7.  
—  Table 7 in here —  
 
The regression results from Model 1 show that whether a firm is family owned 
or not does not have any impact on its capital. The result is consistent with the findings made 
by Anderson and Reeb (2003) who also state that insider ownership does not have a signifi-
cant relation with the financial choices of the firm. In line with our first hypothesis regarding 
family  business  and  leverage  an  interpretation  of  the  result  is  that  advantages  of  family 
control are not large enough to justify a lower leverage. Also, ownership concentration does 
according to Model 1, surprisingly not influence the level of debt that a firm would choose.  
Asset tangibility on the contrary has a significant and positive impact on leverage which can 
be explained by the fact that such assets can be used as collaterals. One can also see that when 
the profitability of the firm increases, the leverage of the firm falls. Thus, the firm will prefer 
to employ internally generated cash flows when earnings are higher.  
In all models firm age proves to be significantly related to the debt and equity ratio. 
The relation is significantly negative, which implies that as time passes by a firm choose to 
reduce the amount of debt in its financing scheme. This result contradicts the arguments of 
Romano, Tanewski and Smyrnios (2000) who state that debt is positively associated with 
family firm age. It thereby also contradicts our third hypothesis. An interesting observation in this context is that Blanco-Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puente and Castrillo (2007) indicate the 
same relation as our findings between age and leverage in their empirical study of private 
Spanish SMEs. 
Our firm age findings are also partly consistent with those of Schulze, Lubatkin and 
Dino’s (2003) who declare that when a firm’s ownership changes from a controlling owner to 
a sibling partnership, the debt financing declines. Hence, when the firm grows further over 
time and exits from a concentrated ownership stage to more divided shareholding, the debt 
financing decreases. The research proposes that the owners are more likely to care for their 
own benefits at the sibling partnership stage, and thus the agency conflicts become more 
extensive.  Dilemmas  such  as  negative  parental  altruism  and  differing  interest  of  family 
members, among others, might become apparent, and cause the conflicts within the firm to 
widen. Demands on a higher level of dividend payment may also become evident. As a result, 
the debt financing falls and the firm develops a more risk averse behavior.  
At last, the perhaps most interesting propositions of our thesis is the one inspired by 
Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) use; i.e. to depict the relationship between ownership 
dispersion and leverage as curvilinear. In contrast to Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) we 
changed the research focus from an industrial level to a firm level. Surprisingly, our results 
proved that the relationship between ownership dispersion and leverage in family firms still 
can be graphed as a U-shaped curve. Schulze and his colleagues only arrived at this result in 
the  high  growth  industry  sector.  We  obtained  the  same  result  directly  by  running  the 
regression without taking into account the effects of market growth. Model 2 describes that 
the corresponding signs of BVP and BVP_squared do indeed follow the U-shaped curve, even 
though the former (BVP) is not statistically significant. When including the interaction terms 
(BVP*Sales growth and BVP_squared*Sales growth) we also obtain a significant result as the 
outcome from Model 3 indicates.  Our findings can thus be explained in the same way as Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 
(2003). At first, ownership is assumed to be concentrated, and the level of debt is predicted as 
higher. However, as ownership is further divided and the firm enters the sibling partnership, 
the agency conflicts and other difficulties are assumed to position the firm in a conflicting 
state. The firm would then choose to reduce debt (BVP show a negative relationship with 
leverage, although it is not significantly negative). Then, as ownership fractionalizes further, 
the firm reaches the cousin consortium level with almost complete dispersion. As each share-
holder is assumed to realize the importance of avoiding agency conflicts, the firm develops a 
more optimistic investment behaviour. The aim becomes to satisfy outside shareholders and 
maintain  a  convincing  growth.  Therefore,  debt  will  be  preferred  again  at  this  stage 
(BVP_squared exhibits a significantly positive relationship with the debt and equity ratio). 
 
Conclusion 
Family firms have existed for a long time.  It is not only amongst MEs that 
family businesses are prevalent. Many of the largest companies are since a long time, or have 
recently taken, the form of a family firm. Their importance and position on the world market 
is getting increasing attention in economic research. One important aspect of family business 
is how they are financed. This is the focus in our paper. As far as we know the study is the 
first of its kind with Swedish data. Consequently, we did not have any priors on how Swedish 
family  firms  actually  act  in  relation  to  leverage.  We  have  chosen  to  analyse  the  capital 
structures and ownership dispersion in closed medium sized family firms. 
 
More specifically we address the following questions; 
Is there a relationship between family ownership and use of debt? 
Is there a U-shaped relationship between family ownership dispersion and leverage? Does firm age influence capital structure? 
 
In the first case, the result achieved was not significant. Although there are several 
theories and arguments that propose the relevance of this relationship, our study was not able 
to ascertain the hypothesis. However, our study is in line with the findings of Anderson and 
Reeb  (2003),  who  point  out  the  non  existing  relationship  between  insider  ownership  and 
leverage. Hence, from an agent cost perspective the advantages of family control does not 
seem to be large enough to warrant a lower leverage. 
The hypothesis concerning ownership dispersion and leverage did exhibit a significant 
result; thus agreeing with the U- shaped relation suggested by Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino 
(2003). Although our study included a smaller and more limited dataset, and is conducted on a 
firm level, the results are identical. 
Firm age appeared to significantly lower leverage for prate MEs. An interpretation of 
this result should be the subject of future research. An interesting observation is that Blanco-
Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puente and Castrillo (2007) indicate the same relation between age 
and leverage in their empirical study of private Spanish SMEs. 
We  are  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  our  study  has  a  limited  dataset  along  with  a 
definition that complicates its comparison to other studies.  For instance, our definition was 
purely based on the perception and response of the investigated firms, who simply had to state 
whether  they  believe themselves to  be  a family  firm or not.  We  also  understand that by 
excluding firms with ownership stake by the five largest shareholders being less than 66.67 
percent, we risk losing some family firm observations. Nevertheless, we had to make a trade 
off, since this would prevent a bias estimate of ownership dispersion later on when calculating 
the Herfindahl index.  
 For  further  research  we  therefore  propose  that  a  quantitative  definition  should  be 
implemented were the percentage of family ownership is analysed. The significant results achieved  concerning  family  firm  age  and  leverage  could  also  be  further  explored  to  see 
whether it may follow a curved relation when considering a longer time span as seen in 
Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino’s (2003) research. 
Also, many of the earlier studies that we have investigated have not considered closed 
firms, but have focused on public listed firms instead. This does affect their result as the 
access and relation to debt and equity changes considerably when a firm is either of closed or 
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Online Sources 






 Sample sizes and respective groups 
Groups  Number of firms in 
the sample 
5-9  622 
10-19  359 
20-49  242 














Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Leverage  Leverage (%) is calculated directly from 
AMADEUS: 
                                           
                         ×100% 
AMADEUS (2008) 
Family firm  In the survey, the firms are asked if they 
consider themselves to be a family firm or not. 
We use a dummy variable for family 
businesses. If the answer is ―Yes‖, it is equal to 
1 and if the answer is ―No‖ then it would take 







The Herfindahl index is calculated by the total 
sum of squares of the fractions of equity held by 





Age  Age = 2008- Year of incorporation +1  AMADEUS (2008) 
Asset 
tangibility 
The asset tangibility is used as a proxy for the 
firm’s collateral value. We use the lag value of 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
                         
                     
AMADEUS (2008) 
Profitability  We use the lag value of the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets. 
           
                    
AMADEUS (2008) 
Taxes  Effective tax rate = Taxation (2008)/ EBIT 
(2008) 
AMADEUS (2008) 






BVP is calculated as the sum of squares of the 
minority board members’ percentage share of 
the votes divided by the square of the votes held 






Firm’s sales  The firm’s sales growth is used as a proxy for 
the industry sales growth. Here we use a 
AMADEUS (2008) growth 
(SG) 
dummy variable for SG. If the firm’s sales 
growth rate is larger than the median level of 
the sample, it is coded as 1. Otherwise, it will 
be 0. 
Table 3 
 Descriptive statistics for all firms 
Variables  Minimum  Maximum  Median  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Leverage (%)  0  992.41  25.3  89.533  157.042 
Family 
Business 
0  1  0  0.44  0.497 
Ownership 
Concentration 
0.0017  1  1  0.8117  0.291 
Age  2  131  27  36.60  29.535 
Asset 
Tangibility 
0.0011  0.9849  0.308  0.343  0.2530 
Size  6.2681  8.3621  7.171  7.186  0.3871 
Taxes  -2.3551  1.0816  0.163  0.133  0.2690 
Profitability  -0.1660  0.5481  0.133  0.150  0.1110 
Table 4 
 Descriptive statistics for family firms only 
Variable  Minimum  Maximum  Median  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Leverage (%)  0  501.18  39.73  75.83  96.38 
BVP  0  3  0  0.409  0.594 
BVP_squared  0  9  0  0.516  1.213 
Sales growth  0  1  -0.057  0.51  0.503 
BVP*sales growth  0  3.00  0  0.229  0.531 
BVP_squared*Sales 
growth 
0  9.00  0  0.331  1.172 
Profitability  -0.1207  0.49  0.16  0.16  0.091 
Asset tangibility  0.0155  0.8961  0.39  0.37  0.225 
Taxes  -0.4407  0.4401  0.147  0.14  0.131 
Size  6.7262  11  9.439  9.42  0.818 Age  2  131  33  38.77  29.5 
 
Table 5 
Correlation between the variables in the data consisting of all firms 




Profitability  Asset 
tangibility 
Taxes  Size  Age 
Family 
business 
1             
Ownership 
concentration 
-0.171*  1           
Profitability  0.106  -0.02  1         
Asset 
tangibility 
0.097  -0.079  -0.08  1       
Taxes  -0.006  -0.05  0.164*  -0.211**  1     
Size  -
0.217** 
0.146  -0.081  0.075  -
0.206** 
1   
Age  0.058  0.136  -0.124  0.094  -0.055  0.202**  1 
N=177 
*Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
**Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 
Table 6 
Correlation between the variables in the data consisting only family firms 
Variables  BVP  Sales 
growth 
Age  Asset 
Tangibility 
Profitability  Size  Taxes 
BVP  1             
Sales 
Growth 
0.066  1           
Age  -0.069  -0.133  1         
Asset 
tangibility 
0.033  0.11  -0.062  1       
Profitability  0.14  0.125  -0.185  0.070  1     
Size  -0.146  0.105  0.046  0.098  -0.174  1   
Taxes  0.214  0.002  -0.22  -0.414**  0.25*  -0.118  1 
N=78 
*Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
**Correlation is significant at 0.01 level Table 7 
Regression Analysis for Leverage (Leverage dependent variable) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Family Business  6.28 (0.28)     
Ownership 
Concentration 
37.46 (1.0)     
Age  -0.82** (-2.2)  -0.97 *** (-3.0)  -1.1*** (-3.3) 
Asset tangibility  237.2 *** (5.5)  49.1 (1.1)  70.8 (1.5) 
Profitability  -328.0 *** (-3.4)  -124.1 (-1.2)  -118.5 (-1.1) 
Taxes  -44.0 (-1.1)  -364.7 *** (-4.4)  -375.3 *** (-4.6) 
Size  -12.99 (-0.44)  4.6 (0.40)  1.5 (0.13) 
BVP    -49.9 (-1.4)  106.2 (1.2) 
BVP_squared    33.2* (2.0)  -106.3 (-1.5) 
BVP*Sales growth      -174.2* (-1.9) 
BVP_squared*Sales 
Growth 
    150.0 ** (2.0) 
R
2  0.24  0.40  0.43 
Adjusted R
2  0.21  0.34  0.36 
F-statistic  7.51***  6.62***  5.76*** 
N  177  78  78 
t-statistics within parenthesis 
* p-value ≤ 0.1 
** p-value ≤ 0.05 
*** p-value ≤ 0.01 